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State Competence to Terminate
Concession Agreements with Aliens
By DAVID C. BALDUSO
Introduction
International law today recognizes unequivocally the competence of states to take, within certain limitations, any property
owned by an alien.' This means that a government's decision
ordering an alien to transfer his property to the state will be
considered lawful by other states and protected by them. While
the limitations on this competence-compensation, public purpose
and non-discrimination-do not enjoy such broad international
support, the controversy over them has not lessened support for
the community policy protecting state competence to take alien
property.
When, however, the government's demand that property be
transferred to the state interferes with the expectations created
by a concession agreement, a more controversial issue is presented.
If a government has promised a foreign corporation that it may
drill oil on a certain piece of land for thirty years, and five years
later the government takes the land, the problem is regarded as
different than if the foreign corporation merely owned the land.
The claim is made that the existence of expectations created by a
concession agreement distinguishes the two situations, depriving
the government of the competence to take any action interferring
with the expectations is created, even if the government's purpose
is public and non-discriminatory and compensation is paid. The
Committee on the Study of Nationalization of the American
* A.B., Dartmouth College, 1957; MA., University of Pittsburgh, 1962; LL.B.,
Yale Law School, 1964.
1 See, e.g., General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) Dec. 14, 1962; Sohn

& Baxter, Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens 103 (Draft No. 12, 1961); "State Responsibility.' 2 Yearbook of the In'l
L. Comm. 104, at 117 (A/CN.4/106) (1957); White, Nationalization of Foreign
Property (1961); Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law (1959);

Foighel, Nationalization: A Study in the Protection of Alien Property in laternational Law (1957).
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Branch of the International Law Association states the claim this
way:
Is 'nationalization' a valid excuse for the breach by a State of
its contracts with foreigners?... In the view of the Committee, restrictions upon the taking of alien interests ... may be

expressed or implied by contract
requires they be respected. 2

. International law

It follows from this that the remedy for a unilateral termination
is specific performance of the concession promise, although when
this is "not possible" the remedy urged is the payment of lost
3
profits.
The counterclaim recognizing state competence to terminate
rests on the proposition that contract rights are no different from
other property rights and that the unilateral termination of a
concession is lawful, subject, of course, to the limitations of compensation and non-discriminatory purpose. Professor Isi Foighel
presents the claim as follows:
The fact that nationalization is not a breach of international
law cannot be altered by the fact that nationalization destroys
contract rights, for example, a concession which the nationalizing state has granted to a foreign company. There is no rule
of international law that gives a greater degree of protection4
to rights secured by contract than to other rights of property.
The claim denying state competence to terminate concessions
has several justifications. The first is that contracts are of such
great importance to any legal system their performance should be
required. Professor Olmstead states, for example, that:
Any part3, has a duty to perform its obligations under a valid
contractual agreement.... As all legal systems seem to enforce
contracts between individuals who are subject to their juris2
"Nationalization of the Property of Aliens," 18 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 367,
:376 (1958).
3

"Thus, the remedy for breach by a State of a contract with an alien

whether designated as a breach or a taking or as expropriation or nationalization,

is in the nature of specific performance. Where specific performance actually is

no longer possible, then the foreign contractor must be placed as nearly as
possible in the position he would have enjoyed absent the breach, that is to say,

he isentitled to the profits he would have earned had not his contract rights been
taken." Id. at 376-77; Kissam & Leach, Sovereign Expropriation of Property and
Abrogation of Concession Contracts, 28 Fordham L. Rev. 177, 214 (1959).
4 Foighel, op. cit. supra note 1, at 74; White, op. cit. supra note 1, at 86;
Wortley, op. cit. supra note 1, at 111; Speech by Mr. Kano, Nigerian Delegate to
the Economic and Financial Committee of the General Assembly, U.N. Gen. Ass.
Off. Rec. 17th Sess. 2nd Comm, 295 (A/C. 2/SR. 794-878) (1963).
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diction, it is indeed paradoxical for the states of the world
community to refuse to apply5 this same standard to their own
agreements with individuals.
The second justification rests on the maxim pacta sunt
servanda (agreements are binding). Agreements between governments (treaties), it is argued, cannot be terminated unilaterally
because of the principle pacta sunt servanda; and because concession agreements are so similar to treaties, the principle also
applies to them, making their unilateral termination unlawful.8
The analogy between treaties and concessions draws strength from
the frequent participation of the concessionaire's government both
in the negotiation of the concession and in the settlement of
disputes that arise during its performance. 7 Morever, the large
size of corporate concessionaires and the "public" nature of concession agreements further contribute to the comparison between
8
concessions and treaties.
The third justification which elaborates the distinction between contracts and other types of property is stated with conviction by Professors Sohn and Baxter of Harvard.
It has on occasion been suggested that a concession constitutes
a property right as well as a contract and that in the former
aspect it is subject to expropriation or nationalization provided
compensation is paid. . . . The logical consequence of the
adoption of such a view would be to place a concession in the
category of 'property of an alien .... To provide that obligations under concessions and contracts may be terminated
against the payment of compensation is to embrace the theory,
now discredited, that a promisor has an option of performing
his contract or paying the stipulated price for non performance
GOlmstead, Nationalization of Foreign Property Interests, Particularly Those
Subject To Agreements With The State, 32 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1123, 1136 (1957);
B randon, Legal Aspects of Private Foreign Investments, 18 Fed. B.J. 298, 339
(1958).
6 "International law recognizes that the principle pacta sunt servanda applies

to the specific engagements of States towards other States or the nationals of other
States and that in consequence, a taking of private property in violation of a
specific state contract is contrary to international law." Committee on Protection
of Investments Abroad in Time of Peace, Int'l B.A. 7th Conf. Rep. 485 (1958);
O'Connell, Legal Issues in the Persian Oil Dispute, 28 New Zealand L.J. 57, 58
(1952); see, Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 775.
7 Schwebel, International Protection of Contractual Arrangements, Am. Soe'y
Int'l L. Proc. 266, 267 (1959).

8See Miller, The Corporation as a Private Government in the World Com-

munity, 46 Va. L. Rev. 1959.
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in the form of damages. Such a view suggests that compliance
with contracts, including concessions, is a matter of expediency, and that no moral opprobrium attaches to the violation
of the promisor's pledged word. In strong contrast stands the
power of a State to take property for its own use or for that
of other persons-a power which is recognized by the principal
legal systems of the world, although the purposes for which it
may be exercised may vary from State to State.9
The fourth and most significant justification focuses on the
effect a recognition of state competence to terminate concessions
would have on the flow of private foreign investment.
The interest in a maximum flow of international capital and
trade is, as a matter of economic fact, and as between borrower and investor, buyer and seller, wholly mutual. International contracts are a primary means of implementing that
interest. Unilateral repudiation or alteration by States of their
contracts with aliens hardly promotes that interest or the conclusion of contracts which is its expression. 10
Stephen Schwebel goes so far as to assert: "If states were to be
deemed to have reserved a legal right to violate their international
contracts, the foreign investor would conclude no such contracts
at all."'" This statement assumes that the community's branding
of a termination as unlawful and its demands for specific performance or lost profits will significantly deter termination and
2
thereby promote the flow of international investment.'

0 Sohn & Bxter, op. cit. supra note 1, at 124; Ray, Law Governing Contracts
Between States and Foreign Nationals, in Southwest Legal Foundation, Proceedings of the 1960 Institute on Private Investments Abroad 5, 9 (1960); Holmes
stated that: "The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it, and nothing else." Holes, The
Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 462 (1897).
1)Comnittee on the Study of Nationalization, supra note 2, at 876; see
Carlston, "Concession Agreements and Nationalization," 52 Am. J. Int'l L. 260
(1958).
11 Schwebel, supra note 7, at 269; Professor O'Connell writes: "If States
were able to cancel their contracts with foreign nationals there would be no
security of investment and the smooth functioning of economic no less than of
international relations would be severely impaired." O'Connell, supra note 6, at
58; Ray,
supra note 9, at 73.
1
2 "First, there is, or ought to be, a deterrent effect upon the breach of
international contracts where such breach is recognized by international law as
unlawful. That deterrent effect may
be tangible as well as psychological, for
other states are not required to gi~9e effect to an act that violates international
law." Schwebel, supra note 7, at 272; (If lost profits were paid] there would
appear to be virtually no economic, but only an emotional, point in the state's act.
It may be added that in cases of some major investments, the impossibility of
payment of full compensation would, as a matter of law, debar taking.' Id. at 273.
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A fifth and final justification rests on the fear that recognition
of such a competence would increase the danger of fighting in the
settlement of concession disputes. "It seems plain," Mr. George
Ray of Aramco has written, "that to permit this change would
result in the substitution of the will of the State for law, and,
therefore, would increase the risks of resorting to force for the
protection of claimed rights."' 3
The claim that states lack the competence to terminate concessions, while advanced during the 1930's has been made with
increasing vigor during the last ten years by members of the legal
profession, 1 4 businessmen, 15 and publicists16 from the capital
exporting states, particularly the United States. Because of the
of support for the claim, it has been labelled the
recent resurgence
"modern' '1 7 theory of concession agreements, while the view that
concessions may be expropriated in the same way as any other
property is called the traditional theory.
Proponents of the "modern" view recognize that controversy
exists on this issue, but they insist that contemporary international
law not only should reflect their viewpoint, but also that it does.
The purpose of this article is to challenge that view. It will be
argued that the question is still unsettled, and that the "modem"
theory states the law neither as it is nor as it should be.
Part I explains how controversies over the termination of
concessions arise and are settled in the world today. Part II suggests a community policy which reasonably accommodates the
conflicting interests in termination disputes, while Part III describes how past disputes on this issue have been decided. Part IV
concludes that international law should protect state claims to
terminate.
13 Ray, supra note 9, at 73.
14 See, e.g., Committee on the Study of Nationalization, supra note 2; Committee on Protection of Investments Abroad in Time of Peace, supra note 6;
American Bar Association, Section of International and Comparative Law, The
Protection of Private Property Invested Abroad (1963).
15 See, e.g., National Ass'n of Manufacturers, Industry Believes (1960); Ray,
supra note 9.
16 See, e.g., Carlston, supra note 10, at 260; Wadmond, The Sanctity of
Contract between a Sovereign and a Foreign National, American Bar Association,
Section of Mineral and Natural Resources, Am. B.A. Proc. 177 (1957); Domke,
Foreign Nationalizations-Some Aspects of International Law, 55 Am. J. Int'l L.
585 (1961); and see writers cited in notes 5, 7, and 9 supra.
17 Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors 262 (1962).
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AGREEMENT, TERMINATION,

CLAIM AND AUTHORITATIVE

DECISION

a. Agreement
A concession agreement creates expectations that an alien
investor may use certain national resources, land and public facilities for an agreed upon time. 8 In exchange for the government's
promise creating this expectation, the alien agrees to invest his
capital and skill in the development of a natural resource (e.g.,
oil), or in the construction and operation of a public utility (e.g.,
canal, railroad), or other enterprise desired by the government
(e.g., oil refinery). Because such undertakings usually require
both substantial investment and a number of years of operation
to become profitable, a state promise in the form of a concession
agreement is frequently a prerequisite to the type of investment
that governments desire.
The government's objective in making the agreement may
simply be to share in the concessionaire's profits, although it may
hope additionally to stimulate the nation's economy, or to improve
the skills and enlightenment of its nationals. Conclusion of a
concession can also win for the grantor government economic and
power benefits from the alien's government. Concession agreements, therefore, provide an opportunity for a greater creation
and sharing of wealth and other values than would be possible if
the government and concessionaire were left to their own resources.
b. Termination
If the concession agreement is freely entered, the parties share
at least momentarily a common interest in following the policies
projected by it. But, as common experience teaches us, political
or economic changes may persuade a nation's leaders to terminate
or alter a previously granted concession. The problem for the
government usually involves wealth or power. The concession
may be considered a bad bargain, with termination providing an
opportunity to get another concession and a higher return from
the same or another concessionaire.' 9 Or the government may
1
8 See Carlston, International Role of Concession Agreements, 52 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 618 (1957).
19 The Iranian Government was motivated by this consideration in both its
1932 and 1951 terminations of oil concessions held by a British concessionaire.
Cottam, Nationalism In Iran 204-05 (1984).
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plan to take over the concession and enjoy the profits presently
made by the concessionaire. Termination may also be seen simply
as a means of halting the extraction of natural resources. In many
underdeveloped nations, demands are strong: (a) that the nation's
natural wealth should only be used to promote national development; and (b) if income from the exploitation of resources is no
longer needed for this purpose, the natural wealth should be left
20

in the ground.

Termination may also be motivated by power considerations. In many underdeveloped nations, control of the nation's
resources is perceived as a means to political power. Indeed, it is
widely believed that "unless a state is the master of its own
resources, it cannot exercise the right of political self-determination.''21 The fear is that foreign corporations will act as agents
for their governments in the exercise of the political influence
provided by large concessions, thereby re-instituting colonialism
under a new form-neo-colonialism. While this expectation may
sound preposterous to American ears, there is little doubt that it is
shared by many Afro-Asians. Consider this statement by a
Burmese U.N. delegate:
The so-called 'complex of formerly colonized countries' was
attributable to a still too recent past. Moreover, the countries
that had just gained their independence did not forget that
their still precarcious sovereignty continued to be threatened
by a new form of colonialism. His country, for its part,
remembered that -when it lost its independence, it had been
colonized originally not by the United Kingdom, but by the
British East India Company. His delegation therefore felt
that developing nations must be protected against the possible
22
encroachment by companies of the rights of the State.
20 Many politically aware Iranians believe, for example, that the nation's oil
is a "god-given resource which if properly utilized can raise the standard of
living of the people, establish a healthy industrial-agricultural economy, and

restore much of te prestige and dignity Iran has lost," but that if "maximum
returns from this great resource" are not realized "it is best that Iran's oil stay
underground . . . despite the suffering that cutting off the oil revenue would
roduce." Id. at 202; Argentina's termination of fourteen concessions on November 15, 1963 was partly motivated by a desire to preserve the nation's oil reserves.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1963, p. 49, col. 1.
21 Hyde, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources, 50 Am.
J. Int'l L. 854, 857 (1956).
22 U. N. Gen.Ass. Off. Rec. 17th Sess., 2nd Comm. 394 (A/C.2/SR. 794-878)
(1963); Hyde, supra note 21, at 858.
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Thus, the objective in termination may be to transfer control of
an important basis of political power to the terminating government or to a concessionaire of different nationality.
The motive in terminating may also be to gain a power
advantage with the concessionaire's government. Since a termination is generally perceived to be a deprivation by the concessionaire's government, it or threat of it may constrain the concessionaire's government to follow a course desired by the termi23
nating government.
The government's internal power position can also be a consideration. Public opinion may demand the end of certain concessions, or termination may strengthen a government politically
24
in need of an act of belligerance toward *the "imperialists."
Domestic power considerations may also be important in nation
or industry-wide nationalizations. Usually justified in terms of
socialism, communism, social reform, or revolution, general expropriations of this type are frequently designed to reorganize

the power and wealth structure of an industry or of the entire
nation.25 In contrast, special, small scale expropriations normally
have no power consequences for the government.
Termination can be undertaken with or without the consent
of the concessionaire. If the concessionaire is willing to substitute
a new agreement, or to accept compensation in exchange for his
defeated expectations, no controversy will arise. If, however, the
concessionaire will not consent, the. government's course will

depend on whether the terms of the concession provide some
basis for a possible termination (e.g., non-performance by the
concessionaire or change of conditions). When the facts provide
the basis for such a claim the government may sue for termination
in its own courts. Generally, however, the concession and the
facts provides no such justification. The government must then
exercise its sovereign power by enacting a local law which: (a)
terminates the concession promise without transferring control
of the enterprise; or (b) takes the concession property; or (c)
23

In 1958, for example, Indonesia terminated a number of Dutch concessions

as a means of influencing Dutch policy in West New Guinea. See p. 91 infra.

21 Internal power was a consideration in President Nasser's decision to
terminate the Suez Canal concession in 1956, and in Argentina's November 1963
terminations; see pp. 88, 93, infra.
25 Fatouros, op. cit. supra note 17, at 242.
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makes the government's promised performance impossible.2 6 Upon
termination the government may tender compensation, a promise
to pay compensation in the future, or it may offer nothing.
c. Claims
In the course of terminations taken against the consent of the
concessionaire, disputes arise, and claims are made to authoritative
decision makers2 7 for the prescription and application of community policy. The usual claimants, the terminating state, the
concessionaire, and the concessionaire's government, each hope
that international law will support his demands, which for the
deprived concessionaire, will be the recovery of the concession
property or damages. Another possible claimant is the purchaser
of expropriated property. He may find himself in a national court
defending against the claims of an expropriated concessionaire
who insists that because the termination was unlawful, the boatload of oil, tobacco, sugar or other commodity in the buyer's possession belongs to the plaintiff concessionaire.
The specific claims made by these claimants fall into three
main categories. First are the claims relating to the competence
of the government to terminate a concession at all, while the
second category relates to limitations on the competence to
terminate-compensation, the government's purpose in terminating, and specific promises made not to terminate during the
period of the concession. The third category of claims relates to
the payment of compensation. The second and third categories of
claims, included in the summary below, are not analyzed in this
article, but are set forth here to place the competence issue in full
context.
CLAIMS RELATING TO THE TERMINATION OR ALTERATION OF
CONCESSION AGREEMENTS UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT THE
CONSENT

OF THE CONCESSIONAIRE

1. Claims relating to state competence to terminate.
II. Claims relating to limitationson the competence to terminate.
A. Claims relating to the duty to pay compensation.
26 See Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 572,
574-77 (1960); Fatouros, op. cit. supra note 17, at 236-42.
27 An authoritative decision maker is an individual whom the community
expects will resolve the conflicting claims made to him.

19641

STATE COMPETENCE To TEMI

,ATE
AGREEM.ENTS

B. Claims relating to the purpose of the terminating government.
1. Public purpose
2. Power purpose
3. Discriminatory purpose
C. Claims relating to government promises that it will not
terminate during the term of the concession.
III. Claims relating to compensation.
A. Claims relating to the amount of compensation paid.
B. Claims relating to when compensation is paid.
C. Claims relating to how compensation is paid.
d. Authoritative decision
The government officials of nation-states play the most important role in the authoritative resolution of termination disputes. Executive officials of the capital importing and capital
exporting states serve the double function both of making claims
to authority and of deciding through negotiations the controversies that their claims and counterclaims create. But unlike most
areas of international law, claims relating to the termination
problem are not made with expectations of reciprocity. Since the
flow of capital today is primarily one way, from the wealthier to
the poorer nations, the Afro-Asian and South American states
have few opportunities to claim on behalf of a deprived concessionaire, while the wealthier states lack identification with the
problems of the underdeveloped states. Without the expectation
that the identical claim may be shortly directed against him, the
governmental claimant and decision maker has more difficulty in
perceiving the common interests that exist between the parties
to a dispute.
Government officials and their agents also serve on arbitration
commissions agreed upon by states to settle termination disputes.
Judges in national courts outside the terminating state may pass
on the lawfulness of a termination when the deprived concessionaire seeks to recover expropriated commodities within the
court's jurisdiction. A final but important group of authoritative
decision makers are the arbitrators agreed upon by the parties to
a concession.
International organizations have played a relatively minor role
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in the termination problem. Neither The Permanent Court of
International Justice nor the International Court of Justice has
passed on the merits of a termination dispute which did not
involve a treaty. During the last decade, however, U.N. organs
have sought to clarify community policy on the protection of
foreign investments and have touched the termination problem.
The International Law Commission has undertaken the task of
codifying the law of state responsibility, 2 while both the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over National Wealth and
Resources and the General Assembly have labored to develop a
compromise between the conflicting demands of the capital im29
porting and capital exporting communities.
Through this process of authoritative decision, the nations of
the world seek to identify and promote the common interest
while rejecting those claims which ignore or oppose such interest.
Both capital importing and capital exporting states have a common interest in promoting persuasive rather than coercive economic relations and in stimulating the interstate flow of capital,
goods and services. 30 Governments also share a common interest
in protecting their authority and control over natural resources3 '
and in ensuring fair treatment for their nationals abroad. 32 When
these interests have conflicted in particular controversies, the
general community acting through authoritative decision makers
has normally presumed in favor of the accommodation of interests
which contributes most to the common good.
Because international organizations have played such a small
role in the settlement of particular termination disputes, the
enforcement of authoritative decisions has been left primarily to
the states involved. As a result, decision makers have had to rely
on the resources of their governments and on their own authority
to gain compliance with decisions taken. The traditional authori28 See State Responsibility, 2 Yearbook of the Int'l L. Comm. 1 (A/CN.4/119)
(1959) for a review of the Commission's work; Garcia Amador, State Responsibility: Same New Problems, 94 Hague Recueil 865 (1958).
29 U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 17th Sess., 2nd Comm.'(A/G.2/SR. 794-878);
Yearbook of the United Nations: 1962 504 (1963); Hyde, supra note 21, at 854.
30 General Assembly Resolution 626 (VII) Dec. 21, 1952, for example

expressed the need for "maintaining the flow of capital in conditions of security.
31 TeGeneral Assembly has affirmed the national "Bight to exploit freely

national wealth and resources" and called on all states to "refrain from acts,

direct or indirect designed to impede the exercise of the sovereignty of any state
over its natural resources." Ibid.
32 See General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) Dec. 14, 1962.
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tative doctrines regarding state responsibility for injuries to aliens
provide the most important means of inducing compliance,
although the economic instrument through control of trade and
aid has also been used.
In summary, the function of prescribing what termination
claims will be protected by international law has been fulfilled
by a variety of authoritative decision makers. State practice, in
the form of diplomatic settlements between governments, both
public and private arbitrations, and municipal judicial decisions
have played the major role in shaping community expectations,
although during the last ten years the U.N. General Assembly
has added to the stream of authoritative communication, providing further insight into what future authoritative decisions will
be. The function of applying community policy to particular
disputes has been served by diplomatic settlements, arbitration,
and municipal courts.
II. Clarification of Community Policy
The purpose of the following analysis is to present a rationale
for the suggestion that state competence to terminate concession
agreements should be protected by international law. The intention is to approach this task from the standpoint of one more
identified with the interests of the world community as a whole
rather than with any particular group. The legal problem presented by the competence issue is the reasonable accommodation
of the five sets of interests which may be at stake in any concession
termination.
Each national government has a power interest in its freedom
to control the people, resources, and institutions within its jurisdiction. The claim to terminate a concession represents a demand
that the international community protect the terminating government's exercise of its authority and control, while the claim that
a government lacks the competence to terminate is a direct
challenge to this power interest. The second interest involved
is that of the capital exporting states in protecting the investments
of their nationals from deprivation by foreign governments.
Third, the concessionaire's government may perceive a power
interest at stake if the termination: (a) reduces its control over
decisions of the terminating government; or (b) deprives it of a

KENTUCKY LAw JouNAL[

[Vol. 58,

source of raw materials it considers important to its economy or
33

national security.

The fourth interest at stake is the promotion of an international economy in which private investment flows freely across
state lines, while the fifth and final interest that may be engaged
is the minimization of coercion in transnational economic relations. The maintenance of the most primitive form of economic
relations depends on the expectation that coercion will not be
used against the investor or his property in an arbitrary way.
Even more important to the interests of the world community is
the assurance that termination disputes are settled by peaceful
means. The wastefulness of the fighting and economic sanctions
that can accompany disputes over the termination of important
concessions, makes it imperative that the world community refuse
to protect claims creating a serious potential for crisis.
The interests of encouraging investment through persuasive
means are considered inclusive interests because they affect the
value position of all participants in the investment process. In
contrast, the interests of protecting investors and of preserving
or improving the power positions of the states involved are considered exclusive interests because of their more particular and
limited impact on the participants. 4 The legal challenge is to
work an accommodation of these interests which promotes the
common interest. And for this purpose a common interest refers
to one which promotes human dignity through the broadest
shaping and sharing of values by persuasive rather than coercive
means. The following paragraphs suggest a community policy to
achieve this goal in termination disputes, with special reference
to the claim that states lack the competence to terminate concession agreements.
Stated most broadly, the recommended policy is the promotion
33

The nationalization of the Iranian oil industry caused the fear in France

that the Western source of oil in the entire Middle East may be endangered;
85% of French oil imports came from the Middle East. N.Y. Times, May 28,

1951, p. 29, col. 5.
34 The reference of inclusive and exclusive interests is to the degree of their

collective impact on participants involved. Interests are on an inclusive or
exclusive continuum. McDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic, Law and Public Order in
Space 150 (1963). See this work generally for the methodology employed in
this article; this book does not, however, discuss the controversy over the
termination of concession agreements.
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of international investment through persuasive strategies with protection for common exclusive interests and the rejection of special
interests. Maintenance of a steady flow of private foreign investment is a common interest because it can improve the value position of both the investor and host government in a way which
would not be possible without their co-operation. This is not to
say that all existing investment relationships are fair and desirable. But it is in the common good to maintain a sufficient flow
of capital so that governments may enter the investment relationships they desire. The crucial thing is to provide states with the
maximum choice of means to exploit their national resources.
The failure to perceive this fact strengthens the suspicion in some
quarters that the "common interest" of promoting international
investment is simply another label for the investor's interest.
The investor is, of course, in the enviable position of benefiting
from this common interest, but so also does the host government,
a fact reflected by the substantial international support for it.35
The promotion of international investment, embodies two
subsidiary policies: (a) protection of agreements; and (b) payment of equivalent compensation for terminated agreements. The
"modern" view denying competence to terminate rests on the
assumption that if concession expectations are not protected by
specific performance businessmen will not invest abroad. 3 It is
submitted, however, that this assumption overlooks the primary
consideration in foreign investment decisions. The businessman
invests abroad for profit. He is concerned with the protection of
his concession expectations only as a means of ensuring a return
on his money. If the terminating government pays him the
equivalent of the return he anticipated, he may reasonably be
expected to undertake again the same risk in another investment.
If compensation can satisfy the investor's expectations of profit, it
will induce him to re-invest abroad in spite of termination and
can thereby maintain a flow of international investment. To
35 See note 30 supra.
,1 None of the writers supporting the "modem" view has attempted to

document this crucial assumption. Although the effect of past expropriations on

investment decisions is, of course, difficult to demonstrate, the few studies on the
subject indicate that fear of expropriation is only one of many considerations
influencing the decision to invest abroad. See, Fatouros, op. cit. supra note 17,
at 54 n. 75.
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achieve this goal, the level of compensation paid must satisfy this
test: would the typical concessionaire whose enterprise is taken for
compensation be willing to undertake the same investment with
the expectation that he may be treated that way again in the
future?
In applying this policy, the decision maker must determine:
(a) the reasonable expectations of profit created by the initial
agreement; and (b) the extent these expectations were realized
both in performance and in the compensation offered by the
government.
To determine what the investor's reasonable expectations were
at the time of agreement, the decision maker should analyze both
the political and economic risk involved in the investment. On
the economic side, the inquiry would, among other things, look
to the type of industry, the skill and experience of the concessionaire, the amount invested, and the time expected for the
operation to become profitable. But expectations about profits
from a concession will also depend on the perceived probability
that the government will terminate in the future. Obviously, a
company which invests with high prospects of premature termination cannot reasonably expect the same return from its investment
as a company making the same investment on the basis of a good
faith promise not to terminate within fifteen years. To assess the
risk of investment, therefore, the political risks at the time of
agreement must also be analyzed, although from the viewpoint of
community policy a careful distinction must be drawn between
political risks created by the government and those inherent in
the type of enterprise involved. Prior government terminations
and hostile attitudes toward investment which increase the perceived risk of termination at the time of agreement should not be
considered legally relevant. Governments should not be rewarded
for creating destructive communications which work against community interests, while communications creating positive expectations (e.g., promises in statutes and concession agreements) should
be considered by the decision maker. Expectations of premature
termination resulting from the nature of the concession, however,
should be viewed differently. Was it reasonably expected that the
concession enterprise would serve a useful function for the entire
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term of the agreement? Is the concession "closely related to large
and changing public interests"?37
This policy alone would have the effect of encouraging investment in low risk situations and deterring it when economic risk
was high. And often the communities or industries which have
the greatest need for investment present the greatest economic
risk to the investor. In order to encourage investment in high
risk situations where development is important to the national
community, international law should require heavier compensation for the deprived concessionaire who has undertaken such
38
risks.
The level of compensation should also depend on the extent
to which the investor's expectations have already been fulfilled.
Profits may have been so great that termination with but minor
compensation can satisfy the expectations of the investor and
induce him to undertake a similar investment again. On the other
hand, if the expectations of the investor have not been realized
up to the time of termination, the government should pay him
enough of his anticipated, but unrealized, gain to induce the
contemporary businessman to invest with expectations of a similar
termination settlement.
There is no reason why compensation cannot serve the function of promoting an international economy when concessions
are terminated, in the same way that it does when alien "property"
is taken by the state. In terms of this community interest, there
is no difference between "property" and concessions. The important thing in the taking of either interest is the termination
of the alien's expectations about the use of land and resources.
The significance of land "ownership" is the expectation that the
owner may use it indefinitely, while a concession agreement
creates expectations that land and resources may be used for a
certain period of time. The certainty of the expectation in the
two cases is different and can be expected to induce a different
37

(1901).

Transvaal Concessions Commission, Report, 35 Par. Pap., Cd. No. 623, at 8

2 The Transvaal Concessions Commission recommended increased com-

pensation for terminated concessions where "hazardous enterprises have been
pioneered into stability in an unsettled and underdeveloped country where profit
was uncertain and total loss a possible contingency." Ibid.
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type of reliance from an owner than from a concessionaire; but
if the flow of international investment is the concern, a difference
in reliance calls only for different levels of compensation. There
is no reason presented by this interest why a concessionaire's
original expectations must be protected (specific performance of
the concession), while the alien landowner's expectations may be
terminated and replaced with an equivalent (compensation) .9
Moreover, the argument that community adoption of the
"modern" view is needed to maintain a flow of foreign investment
overlooks one-half of the investment process, which requires the
participation and consent of the capital importing government
as well as the investor. What affect, therefore, would the adoption
of the "modern" view have on the willingness of underdeveloped
nations to enter investment agreements? All the available evidence supports Professor White's view that in today's world the
reluctance of many states to admit foreign capital "would be
greatly increased" by such a community policy. Suspicion of
corporate motives, fear of exploitation 40 and political interference
contribute to this condition, which has been described, by a Greek
delegate to the U.N., as follows:
It would ...be regrettable if the attitude of certain develop-

ing countries towards foreign capital was not considered in its
proper context and if account was not taken of the deep current of nationalism and anticolonialism that prevailed in those
countries, even though it was unwarranted. Those countries
often regarded private enterprise and, even more so, foreign
private enterprise, with great distrust.41
The power interest of states in exercising control over people
when exercised within appropriate limits, and resources within
their jurisdiction, is an exclusive interest consistent with the
39
West River Bridg v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848) explicitly repudiated this
distinction. Deciding at Vermont's termination of a bridge concession was
lawful the court said: "We are aware of nothing peculiar to a franchise which
can class it higher, or render it more sacred, than other property." Id. at 533.
40 Mr. Gonzalez of Costa Rica reflected these attitudes in November, 1962,
when he explained before a U.N. committee his country's objection to an
"unrestricted flow of private foreign capital:" (a) it diminished the national

wealth of the recepient country; (b) Costa Rica had had a bad experience with
foreign investment in public services; and (c) "experience had taught" Costa
Rica that the "sole motive" of the investor was profit in spite of what he said.
U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 17th Sess., 2nd Comm. 272 (AIC2ISR. 794-878)
(1968).

41 Id. at 333; another fear expressed in the U.N. was that a lack of competence to terminate would deter agreement because it "discouraged initiative

and left little room for bargaining." Id. at 329.
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common good. Nation states carry the primary responsibility
for the welfare of the world's population. It is desirable, therefore, that each national community enjoy the maximum freedom
of choice in ordering and reordering the use of its resources,
unless this freedom substantially interfers with an inclusive interest or a predominant exclusive interest of another state. Since,
in the termination context, compensation can be made to maintain the flow of international investment, protection of this power
interest promotes the common interest.
Protection of investors from economic deprivation is another
interest deserving of community support, since all states desire
that their nationals be treated fairly by other governments. The
common interest does not, however, appear to support a policy
of lost profits, which represents a limitation on state freedom of
action for the sole purpose of indulging the investor. The lost
profits controversy is primarily a conflict between the exclusive
interests of state and investor, and because of the state's greater
responsibility for the welfare of the world's population, its interest
should prevail over the investor's. Compensation at the level
needed to maintain a flow of foreign investment fulfills the
investor's reasonable expectations of profit and represents a reasonable compromise of the state's and investor's interests.
The power advantage which the concessionaire's government
may derive from a concession is not worthy of community protection. If a concession agreement provides the concessionaire's
government with influence over the decisions of the grantor
government or control over its national resources, a termination,
even if compensated, will extinguish this advantage. Authoritative
protection of this power interest, however, is inconsistent with
the principle that power should be shared between governments
only by persuasive means, in this case by an agreement between
the two governments. In the typical concession there is clearly
no intention on the part of the grantor government to share
power with the concessionaire's government, which is not even a
party to the agreement. Since the grantor government has not
consented to a sharing of power with the concessionaire's government and has received no benefit for its loss of power, community
intervention to protect this interest would not promote the
common good.
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The policy of minimizing coercion in transnational economic
relations also militates against the claim that states must perform
their concession agreements. In important concession disputes,
the terminating government usually perceives important power
interests to be at stake. The result is strong opposition to demands
for specific performance, creating a potential for crisis and coercion between the two states. Similarly, termination of an important concession, even if compensated, can be expected to
create pressure within the concessionaire's government or nation
for corrective action in defense of the national interest. A holding
by international law that compensated terminations are "unlawful" will strengthen the position of those demanding coercive
measures in support of national interests. In contrast, authoritative recognition of state competence to terminate will weaken
supporters of coercive countermeasures by depriving them of a
base of power; instead proponents of moderation and persuasion
would have the weight of international authority on their side.
A community policy supporting the "modern" view may also
increase the reluctance of capital importing states to resolve their
termination controversies through adjudication, a means of dispute settlement with considerable promise but little support today. Professor Olmstead's lament states the problem squarely:
...

it is indeed anomalous that so much uncertainty and doubt

exist about the provision of an accessible and independent
tribunal to which the foreign investor may proceed with a
dispute. Compared with the confidence that a foreign investor
and a State manifest in one another by entering into a foreign
investment agreement, the reluctance of some States to agree
to reasonable and
independent remedies for disputes is diffi42
cult to explain.

Many leaders in the Afro-Asian world entertain serious doubt
about the degree to which traditional international law protects
their vital interests, a suspicion which is particularly acute in
cases involving a direct conflict between their interests and the
interests of the Western powers. 43 Rather than submit to the
42

Olmstead Economic Development Agreements, Part II: Agreements be-

tween States and Aliens; Choice of Law and Remedy, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 504, 508
(1961).
43
See Anand, Role of the "New" Asian-African Countries in the Present
International Legal Order, 56 Am. J. Int'l L. 383, 402 (1962).

In 1952 the

(Continued on next page)
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uncertainties of adjudication, most developing states prefer to
negotiate their differences, and contribute to the development of
an international law in which they have more confidence. Reliance on negotiation between the powerful and weak states usually
involved in termination disputes carries a greater risk that coercion will be employed and crisis or fighting will be the outcome.
A community policy protecting state competence to terminate
can, it is submitted, promote a flow of international investment
through persuasive means and at the same time protect the
exclusive interests of the investor and the terminating state which
promote the common good. The "modern" view overprotects the
interests of the concessionaire and his government, threatens to
discourage the importing of capital, and increases the risk of crisis
and fighting in the settlement of termination controversies.
This analysis has sought a reasonable accommodation of the
interests engaged by a state's termination of its concession promise
to an alien. The same interests are at stake, however, if the
government's promise was made to the concessionaire's government in a treaty, rather than to the alien in a concession agreement. From the standpoint of community policy, the crucial consideration is the effect a termination of expectations about the use
of land and resources will have on the various interests involved.
And since the effects of a termination are the same whether the
promisee is the concessionaire or his government, community
policy should refuse to recognize a demand for specific performance in both situations.
III. The Trend of Past Decision
Past claims that terminating states must specifically perform
their concession agreements have produced three overlapping lines
of authoritative decision. The first 44 ran up to the middle of the

19th century, until which time there were no generally recognized
limits on state competence to terminate. A second line which
began in the 1850's and ran into the 1930's saw primarily small
(Footnote continued from preceding page )

Iranian government's fear of adjudication before the I.C.J. flowed in part from

the expectation in Iran that the Company might be awarded lost profits through
1993, an outcome considered extremely unfair by the Persians. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 2, 1952, p. 1, col. 3.
44 See pp. 76-77 infra.
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scale expropriations. During the early part of this period,
competence to terminate was recognized with compensation as a
limitation,45 while the Great Depression saw an authoritative
groping for some further restriction. 46 The third and final line
of decision 4 7 began in the thirities and continues to date. These
decisions, which have been primarily a response to large scale,
ideologically and power motivated terminations, have generally
recognized the competence to terminate, although the last ten
years has witnessed one arbitral award48 and a rising trend of
doctrinal opinion4 9 supporting the "modern" view.
During the first half of the 19th century the leadership of the
Western powers perceived no interest in promoting foreign investment. Capital was needed at home and foreign investment
tended toward speculations and not toward occupations then
considered productive. 50 As a result, governments generally refused to intervene in termination controversies. The U.S. government justified its application of this policy in four main ways:
(a) intervention was only proper when the wrong complained
of was the equivalent of a common law tort "inflicted by force,
and not the result of voluntary engagements or contracts;"' 51
(b) aliens "must estimate the character of those with whom
they contract and assume the risk of their ability and will to
execute their contracts; '5 2 (c) it does not "comport with the
dignity of any government to make a demand upon another
which might not ultimately, on its face, warrant a resort to force
for the purpose of compelling compliance with it;" 53 and (d) a

different policy "might prove exceedingly inconvenient to some
of the States of this union as well as to other sovereign States."'54
The second half of the 19th century, however, saw changes in
the economy of the industrialized nations which were reflected in
the trend of authoritative decision. In contrast with the earlier
See pp. 77-80 infra.
See pp. 80-85 infra.
47 See pp. 84-94 infra.
48 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil, [1958] 27 Int'l L. Rep. 117, 127.
49 See pp. 56-60 supra.
50
Fatouros, op. cit. supra note 17, at 244.
53 6 Moore, International Law Digest 710 (1906), quoting U.S. Sec. of State
Fish in 1871; see generally id. at 705-10.
52 Id. at 708, quoting U.S. Sec. of State Buchanan in 1848.
53 Id. at 707, quoting U.S. Sec. of State Marcy in 1855.
54 Id. at 709, quoting U.S. Sec. of State Buchanan in 1848.
45
46
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part of the century, "foreign investment began to be regarded
with increasing favor." 5 5 Although governments still refused to
interfere on behalf of their nationals for "mere breach" of contract, claims were advanced if the capital importing state used its
governmental power to deny the investor legal redress for his
defeated expectations. Two situations gave rise to this claim. In
the first, the concessionaire had a claim against the government
based on the terms of the contract, but the government refused
to provide him with an adequate remedy in local court-a denial
of justice.5 6 The outcome of diplomatic intervention in this
situation would be agreement on a decision maker to hear the
claim, either a local judge, an arbitrator, or the diplomats of the
two countries. The second situation arose when the grantor
government employed its sovereign power to terminate a concession without compensation and without recourse to a judicial
determination of the concessionaire's rights-in diplomatic parlance "arbitrary or confiscatory annulments of concessions or
contracts." 57 In this situation the alien would have no remedy
even if the government's courts remained open to him, since the
local court would normally be bound to apply the terminating
law. The outcome of diplomatic interference in such a case would
be: (a) a negotiated settlement of the dispute in whole or in part
by the government officials; and/or (b) agreement that another
decision maker, usually arbitrators, would settle all or part of the
dispute.
On the basis of this policy a large body of termination precedents developed during the late 19th century and the first thirty
years of the 20th century. 58 This writer has found in these cases
Z.5
Fatouros, op. cit. supra note 17, at 244.
5
6 See, Dunn, The Protection of Nationals: A Study in the Application of
International Law 167 (1932); Moore, op. cit. supra note 51, at 717-22; Freeman,
The International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice 111-13 (1938).
575 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 610 (1944); see, Moore, op. cit.
.supra note 51, at 722-28; Wetter, Dipktnatic Assistance to Private Investment:
A Study of the Theory and Practice of the United States During the Twentieth
Century, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 275 (1962).
5S Mulligan (U.S. v. Peru, 1870), 2 Moore, International Arbitrations 1643
(1898); Hammaken (U.S. v. Medco, 1870), 4 Moore, International Arbitrations
3470 (1898); Thurston (U.S. v. Dominican Republic, 1895), 6 Moore, International Arbitrations 729 (1898); Cherry (U.S. v. Colombia, 1897), 3 Whiteman,
Damages in International Law 1714 (1943); Cheek (U.S. v. Siam, 1898), Id. at
1651; Punchard, MeTaggart, Lowther (U.K. v. Colombia, 1899), Whiteman, op.
cit. supra at 1692; Delagoa Bay and East African Railway (U.S. and U.K. v.
Portugal, 1900), Id. at 1694; May (U.S. v. Guatemala, 1900), Id. at 1708;
(Continued on next page)
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no claim that the concessions involved could not be terminated
on payment of compensation; nor did any decision award a
remedy of specific performance, a fact which takes on added
significance in light of the great power of the U.S. government
in South America, where most of the controversies arose. Many
of these decisions do characterize the terminations as unlawful,
but in every instance the basis of this holding was a failure to pay
adequate damages. 59 Nor did these decisions consistently apply a
policy of lost profits. In almost half the leading cases of the
period,60 decision makers refused to consider lost profits, instead
measuring compensation in terms of expenditures made, actual
cost of construction or the value of the concession at the time of
taking. Those decisions awarding lost profits either failed to
explain how they were measured or relied on such concepts asreasonably anticipated, within the contemplation of the parties,
proximate and immediate consequence, probable and not merely
possible.

61

The following summary of two leading cases provides some
insight into community expectations during this period. In the
Delagoa Bay case, the Portugese government had granted to an
American and British owned company a thirty-five year concession
to build and operate a railroad in an African colony.6 2 When the
railroad was near completion, the Portugese government demanded an extension that had not been agreed upon in the
concession. The concessionaire failed to complete the work in the
time required, the concession was cancelled with no tender of
-Footnote continued from.preceding page)

Salvador Comercial (U.S. v. Salvador, 1902), Id. at 1683; Oliva (Italy v.
Venezuela, 1903), Ralston, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903 780 (1904); Rudloff
(U.S. v. Venezuela, 1903), Id. at 194; Company General of the Orinoco (France
v. Venezuela, 1905), Whiteman, op. cit. supra at 1688; Emery (U.S. v. Nicarragua,
1909), Id. at 1643; Shufeldt (U.S. v. Guatemala, 1930), Dept. of State Arb. Ser.
No. 3 (1932).
9 Garcia Amador, Special Rapporteur of the U.N.'s International Law
Commission, writes that in the "quite large number of precedents found in
diplomatic practice . . . at no time was any question raised as to the validity of
the act of expropriation itself; the only issue was the form and measure of the
compensation to be paid to the aliens affected." "States Responsibility, 2 Yearbook of the Int'l L. Comm: 1957 104 at 120 (A/CN. 4/106) (1957).
60 See'cases cited note 58 supra.
61 See Whiteman, op. cit. supra note 58, at 18.36-37 and cases cited note 58
supra.
62 Delagoa Bay and East African Railway (U.S. and U.K. v. Portugal, 1900),
Whiteman, op. cit. supra note 58, at 1694.
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compensation and the railroad siezed. The British government
claimed that the Portugese:
had no right to cancel the concession, nor to forfeit the line
already constructed... and that for that wrong Her Majesty's
Government are bound to ask for compensation .... If the
Portugese Government admit their liability to compensate
...Her Majesty's Government will admit that the amount of
63
that compensation is a proper matter for arbitration.
Washington demanded "restoration of property or indemnity for
losses inflicted" by the Portugese taking.64 A -diplomatic agreement appointed arbitrators to fix "the amount of compensation
due."65 Their opinion stated:
Whether one would, indeed, brand the action of the government as an arbitrary and dispoiling measure or as a sovereign
act prompted by reasons of state which always prevails over
any railway concession, or even if the present case should be
regarded as one of legal expropriation, the fact remains that
the effect was to dispossess private persons from their rights
and privileges of a private nature conferred upon them by the
concession, and .. .the State which is the author of such
dispossession is bound to make full reparation for the injuries
done by it.A
In the Shufeldt claim a ten year concession to extract chicle
in Guatemala was, after six years of operation, terminated by the
legislature on the ground that it was "harmful to the national
interest." 67 A United States claim for damages only was upheld
by the Arbitrator H.K.M. Sisnett:
it is perfectly competent for the Government of Guatemala to
enact any decree they like and for any reasons they see fit.
. .. This Tribunal is only concerned where such a decree,
passed even on the best grounds, works injustice to an alien
subject, in which case the Government ought to make compensation for the injury inflicted .... (8
In contrast to the period from the end of the 19th century to
1930, the period of the Great Depression saw claims denying
63McNair, The Seizure of Property and Enterprisesin Indonesia, 6 Netherlands Int'l L. J. 218, 224-25 (1959).
646 Moore, op. cit. supra note 51, at 728.
65 Whiteman, op. cit. supra note 58, at 1695.
66Id. at 1698.
6eUS.v. Guatemala, 1930 note 58 supra.
68 Id. at 871.
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competence to terminate and heard the first formulations of the
arguments which now support the "modern" view on concession
agreements. The momentum behind this shift in decision appears
to have come from a 1928 decision of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, which stated that specific performance was
the proper remedy for expropriations which terminated treaty
promises.69 In this case the Polish government expropriated a
factory owned by a German national in violation of its treaty
promise that it would take alien property, only under circumstances which did not exist in this case. Before the merits of the
case were heard by the Court, Germany agreed to settle for compensation, which the Court awarded. But in an extremely influential dictum, the Court stated that the proper remedy for an
"illegal" taking of property was: "Restitution in kind, or if that
is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value
which a restitution in kind would bear."70 Even though no
subsequent court or arbitral award has applied this policy in a
treaty dispute, some writers consider it "clear and well settled"
that states lack the competence to take any property which
terminates expectations created by a treaty.71 Moreover, this
principle supplies the basis for the argument that concession
promises must be performed because treaties must be.
The arbitral award, Czechoslovakia v. Radio Corporation of
America (1932) ,72 represents the first authoritative decision to
invoke the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda in the context of a
concession termination dispute. In this case the concessionaire
held a ten year concession to establish and operate a direct radio
circuit between Czechoslovakia and the U.S. After almost three
years of operation, the Czech government informed R.C.A. that
it was granting a second concession to a competitor, a decision
prompted by a decline in governmental revenues from the concession. R.C.A. insisted that the first concession gave it exclusive
rights and that the second concession would interfere with its
09 Case concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Merits),

(1928).

P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 17

70 Id. at 48; see, Baade, Indonesian Nationalization Measures before Foreign
Courts-A Reply, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 801, 825-27 (1960) for an excellent analysis
of this case.
71 Fatouros, op. cit. supra note 17, at 222; the writer lists a number of
authors supporting this view. Id. at 223 n. 20.
o
72.30 Am. J. Int'l L. 523 (1936).
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terms and could not be lawfully granted. The government maintained that the agreement was not exclusive. A panel of three
arbitrators interpreted the concession agreement in favor of
R.C.A., holding that Czechoslovakia "has not the right to establish
a second direct radio telegraphic link,"' 1 3 and that it must specifically perform. The government had argued that public not
private law concepts were applicable. Even conceding this, said
the Tribunal, "in public law the sentence pacta sunt servanda will
also apply, just as public interest requires stability as regards any
arrangement legally agreed upon .

. ."74

The opinion did not,

however, rule out the possibility of lawful termination in all
situations. Indeed, it states explicitly that termination is possible
if the state can "show that public interests of vital importance
would suffer if the agreement should be upheld under the rules
of ordinary civil law." The opinion emphasized, however, that
"any alteration or cancellation of an agreement on this basis as a
rule should only be possible subject to compensation to the other
party. '

75

The Tribunal then went on to hold that sufficient

reason did not exist in this case foi a lawful termination: "that
this expectation sometimes proves to fail in not giving the country
as large a profit as was expected cannot be considered sufficient
reason for releasing that public institution from its obligations as
76
signatory of said agreement."
The facts of the Czechoslovakia case were almost identical to
those in an arbitration between R.C.A. and China three years
later, 7 except that in the China decision, the arbitrators held
that the agreement did not give R.C.A. an exclusive right of
operation. The Chinese government's decision to grant another
concession to a competitor was, therefore, held lawful. Because
the Chinese had neither modified nor terminated the concession
the issue of their competence to do so was not decided. Neverthe73Id. at 534.
74Id. at 531.
75

Ibid.

7Id. at 534; In 1932 another important termination dispute grew out of a
decline of revenues from the Anglo-Iranian oil concession in Iran. The government demanded a new concession, but the company and the British government
denied the right of the Persian Government to cancel the concession unilaterally.
Termination followed and the dispute was brought before the Council of the
League of Nations. But before it acted a new concession was signed on April 29,
193:3. Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers 42-44 (1955).
77Radio Corporation of America v. China (1935), 30 Am. J. Intl L. 535
(1936).
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less, the language of the Tribunal reflected a view similar to that
expressed in the Czechoslovakia case, but without a consideration
of when a compensated termination would be lawful.
The Chinese Government can certainly sign away a part of its
liberty of action; and this also in the field of the establishment
of international radio-telegraphic communications.... It will,
be bound by law and by any obligations
as any other party,
78
legally accepted.
Another authority marshalled in support of the "modem"
view 79 on concessions is the 1935 decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court, Perry v. United States.s0 In this case, the plaintiff sued on
a U.S. government bond which promised repayment in gold.
Before the bond's maturity, Congress decided that U.S. obligations would not be repaid in gold and the Treasury would pay
only in "legal tender currency." The government argued that
it was not bound by the terms of the bond because an earlier
Congress could not restrict a later Congress from regulating the
currency system. It was further asserted that Congress could
repudiate the earlier promise if it finds its "fulfillment inconvenient," and that the "Government cannot by contract restrict
the exercise of a sovereign power." In a 5-4 decision, Chief Justice
Hughes stated that Congress was without power to "alter or
repudiate the substance of its own engagements when it has
borrowed money under the authority which the Constitution
8
confers." '
Because the Court cited international authority8 2 in support of
the state's competence to enter a binding agreement, and because
of Chief Justice Hughes' experience as United States Secretary of
State, the case has affected expectations on an international level,
even though Perry appears to have been a U.S. national. There
are, however, definite limits on the relevance of this case to the
termination controversy. First the holding of the case recognizes
the competence of the government not only to enter a binding
agreement, but also to terminate it if an equivalent is tendered.
8 Id. at 540.
-9 Kissam and Leach, supra note 3, at 202; Ray, supra note 9, at 59-60;

Committee on the Study of Nationalization, supra note 2, at 375; American Bar
Association, op. cit. supra note 14, at 84.
50 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
81 Id. at 350-51.
62 1 Oppenheim, International Law §§ 493-94 (4th ed.); id. at 353.
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For the Court's order was not specific performance (payment of
the gold promised), but the cash value of the difference in purchasing power between the gold he was promised and the $10,000
in legal tender offered by the government.8 3 Second, the policy
applied by the Court, protecting the "credit of the United States,"
has only an indirect relevance to the competence issue in international law.8 4 Third, the Court emphasized that even though
the government bound itself by an agreement, it could lawfully
refuse to perform by invoking its sovereign immunity from legal
process; simply by withdrawing its consent to be sued, the govern5
ment could avoid its binding obligation.
88
Another precedent invoked to deny state competence to
terminate is the Losinger case which came before the Permanent
Court of International Justice in 1936.87 In this controversy,
Yugoslavia terminated a railroad concession agreement which
provided for compulsory arbitration of all disputes. Subsequent
to the termination, a Yugoslav law was enacted requiring all
claims against the government to be made "before the ordinary
courts of the State."8 8 On the basis of this law the arbitrator
refused to hear the concessionaire's claim arising from the termination. The Swiss government thereupon filed a memorial in the
Permanent Court claiming that the Yugoslav Government could
not by local law release itself from the obligation to arbitrate the
termination dispute.8 The relief demanded was an order that
Yugoslavia submit the case to arbitration, i.e., specific performance. The Swiss government argued that:
the principle of pacta sunt servanda must be applicable not
only to agreements directly concluded between states, but also
to those between a State and foreigners .... A State may not
invoke any provisions of its domestic private law or of its
83 294 U.S. 330, 357-58 (1935). And since Perry failed to prove an injury
he was left without a remedy. Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr. writes: "Whatever
conclusions may emerge from a study of the decision, a conviction as to what
it means is not among them . . .the Court made two inconsistent decisions, one
on an abstract question of public morality and the other on a concrete question
of private justice." Hart, The Gold Clause In United States Bonds, 48 Harv. L.
Rev. 1057, 1094 (1935).
84 294 U.S. 830, 351 (1935).
The Court's decision was based on Article I,
See. 8 and See. 4 of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
85 Id. at 354.
8
876 Domke, supra note 16, at 597.
Losinger Case (Preliminary Objection), P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 67 (1936).
88 Id.at 19-20.
89 Id. at 15; Losinger Case, P.C.I.J., ser. C, No. 78, at 7-9 (1936).
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public law in order to evade the performance of valid contractual obligations. To admit the contrary would introduce
an element of chance into all contracts entered into by a State
with aliens since the State would have the power to repudiate
its obligations by means of special legislation.90
The case was ordered on for argument, but before a hearing was
held Yugoslavia and Switzerland agreed "to discontinue the
proceedings." 91 The authority of this case, therefore, resides in
the claim of the Swiss government that Yugoslavia was bound to
perform its arbitration agreement. To what extent the Swiss
arguments reflected community expectations is unclear, and even
if they did it should be observed that the Swiss were only demanding specific performance of the promise to arbitrate; the competence of Yugoslavia to terminate the concession agreement was
not even in issue.
The trend of decision during the Great Depression clearly
reflects a desire to establish some further limit on the competence
to terminate other than the requirement of compensation. The
few relevant cases do not, however, reflect a strong consensus on
what that limitation should be. In addition, both the limited
size of the concessions and the relative unimportance of the government interests at stake in these cases give little insight into
how large scale, ideological, and power motivated expropriations
would be treated by authoritative decision makers. The 1930's,
however, saw the beginning of a line of termination controversies
of precisely this type. The line has continued to the present day,
along with a definite trend of authoritative response in favor of
increased protection for the claim to terminate. This trend can
be attributed in part to the different impact of a large scale
termination on the interests of the terminating government. In
addition, since the breakup of the colonial system, there has been:
(a) increased participation by the capital importing states in the
international legal system; and (b) increased demand by them
for control over natural wealth and resources.
The Soviet Union initiated the first important termination of
this type when in 1929 it ended the concession of the British
firm Lena Goldfields, Ltd. In 1925 Lena had been granted a vast
90 P.C.I.J., Losinger Case-Pleadings, Oral Statements, and Documents, ser.
C, No. 78, at 82 (1936).
91 Losinger Case (Discontinuance), P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 69 (1986).
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exploring, mining and transportation concession as part of the
Soviet national plan for development during the New Economic
Period."2 The company enjoyed considerable success until the
fall of 1929 when the U.S.S.R. launched its first Five Year Plan,
part of which apparently included the termination of the concession. This was achieved through various forms of government
harrassment which finally forced the company to withdraw, whereupon the Soviets claimed termination on the ground of nonperformance. In the ensuing arbitration, the company claimed
damages for breach of contract and in 1930 the Tribunal ordered
that Lena "be compensated in money for the value of the benefit
of which it had been wrongfully deprived. '93 No issue of competence to terminate was raised by the case.
Another important termination occurred in March 1938, when
the Mexican government seized seventeen U.S., British, and Dutch
companies operating under concession agreements. All but one
of the U.S. companies and the British government demanded the
restoration of the seized properties, while the Dutch government
demanded either "adequate, prompt, and effective compensation
or ... return of the properties. . . .
Washington asked only for
compensation, claiming that "the legality of an expropriation is
contingent upon adequate, effective, and prompt compensation."9 5
In the end all three governments settled for compensation.
A major termination dispute grew out of the Iranian government's decision in March 195196 to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company which had been operating under a sixty year oil
concession since 1933. By terminating the Iranian government
hoped to get more Iranians into better positions in the oil industry and to improve the Iranian share of the oil revenue. Another
goal was "to destroy the British ability to interfere in Iranian
'.94

political affairs through the oil company. . .

The Iranian's

0 Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between The Lena Goldfields Ltd. and the
Soviet Gocernment, 36 Cornell L.Q. 31, 47 (1950).
931d. at 51.
9 Baade, supra note 70, at 827-28; see Kunz, The Mexican Expropriations,
17 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. .327, 363-68 (1940).
55 Baade, supra note 70, at 810; the U.S. government took the same position
in a 19:37 concession termination dispute with Bolivia. Wetter, supra note 57, at
:306-7; Kunz, supra note 94, at .368-73.
06 Shwadran, op. cit. supra note 76, at 106 for the text of the nationalization
decree.
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insisted and deeply believed that they had documentary evidence
to prove A.I.O.C. political interference." 97 Compensation was
provided for in an implementation act of April 1951 which: (a)
authorized the government to deposit in a bank up to twenty-five
per cent of oil revenues to meet probable-claims; and (b) set up
a board which was to submit compensation suggestions for ap98
proval by both houses of the legislature.
The demand of the company and the British government for
"full restitution"9 9 of the concession did not, however, rest on the
claim that states lacked the competence to terminate their concessions. In its memorial to the International Court of Justice, the
British government explained that it did "not dissent from the
proposition that a State is entitled to nationalize and generally to
expropriate concessions granted to foreigners to the same extent
as other property owned by foreigners."' ° Rather, the British
demand was based on: (a) an explicit Iranian promise that the
concession would not be ended before its term; and (b) an
alleged discriminatory purpose.
The termination dispute lasted for three years. After the first
attempts at a diplomatic settlement had failed, the British sued
in the International Court of Justice, which held that it lacked
jurisdiction, since a "concessionary contract" could not be considered a "treaty" within the meaning of the Iranian Declaration
of October 2, 1930 conferring jurisdiction on the International
Court.""' Further negotiations between Iran and Britain produced
a 1954 diplomatic settlement granting a new concession to a
consortium of eight foreign oil companies, with the original
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company receiving a forty per cent interest.
Both Iran and the other members of the new Iranian Oil
Consortium paid A.I.O.C. additional compensation. 102
During the three years that Iran and Britain spent negotiating
this settlement, community attitudes on the lawfulness of the
termination were expressed on several occasions. In the initial
97 Cottam, op. cit. supra note 19, at 205; N.Y. Times, July 12, 1951, p. 7, col.
3; Shwadran,
op. cit. supra note 76, at 147.
9
8Anglo-Iranian Oil v. Jaffrate, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 316, 322.
99

ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL CASE-PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND Documnas

117 (I.C.J. 1952).

100 Id. at 85.
10 1 Anglo-Iranian Oil Case (Jurisdiction), [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 93.
102 Shwadran, op. cit. supra note 76, at 188.
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crisis following the termination, 10 3 support for the Iranian position
103 See N.Y. Times, June 12, 1951, p. 17, col. 6; id., June 28, 1951, p. 5, col.

1; id., Nov. 4, 1951, p. 8, col. 2.
came as expected from the capital importing community.

One

year and one-half after the termination, a U.N. resolution,
certainly influenced by the Anglo-Iranian dispute, reflected an
even broader consensus in favor of protection for the competence
to terminate. On December 21, 1952 the General Assembly
recommended by a vote of 36 to 4 that:
all Member States, in the exercise of their right freely to use
and exploit their natural wealth and resources wherever

deemed desirable by them for their own progress and economic development.., have due regard, consistent with their
sovereignty, to the need for maintaining the flow of capital in
confidence and economic coconditions of security, mutual
04
operation among nations.
Two Italian court decisions strengthened the expectations
created by this U.N. resolution. In each case the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company sued a vendee of the Iranian government in local
possession of a boatload of oil, on the ground that the expropriation was unlawful and ownership remained in the concessionaire.
Both courts went directly to the merits, holding the termination
lawful. The first based its decision on the Italian Constitution,
which authorized expropriation if compensation is paid. 1 5 The
second court based its decision primarily on the international
policy which gives states the right to expropriate "any real or
personal rights . . . for reasons of public interest and against

compensation." In the Court's view, the General Assembly resolution of December 21, 1952 constituted "a clear recognition of the
international lawfulness of the Persian Nationalization Laws."'0 6
The dispute following Egypt's nationalization of the Suez
Canal in 1956 was primarily a power contest, although the "legal"
104 Yearbook of the United Nations: 1952 800 (1953); Voting against the
resolution were New Zealand, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom and the
United States.
'15Anglo-Iranian Oil v. S.U.P.O.R. (Ct. of Venice 1953), [19551 Int'l L.
Rep. 19, 22-2,3.
1'1GAnglo-Iranian Oil v. S.U.P.O.R. (Civil Ct. of Rome 1954), 1955] Int'l
L. Rep. 23, 41. On similar facts: (a) the Aden Supreme Court held the Iranian
expropriation unlawful on the ground that the taking was without compensation.
The decision did not suggest, however, that a compensated termination was
unlawful. Anglo-Iranian Oil v. Jaffrate, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 316, 322; (b) two
Japanese courts refused to pass on the lawfulness of the Iranian law. AngloIranian Oil v. Idemitsu Kosen Kabushiki Kaisha, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 305.
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issue focused on the termination of an 1866 canal concession

which had twelve years to run. President Nasser saw in Egyptian
ownership of the Canal a means of financing the Aswan High
Dam, but equally important was his expectation that a hostile act
toward the West, especially against a last vestige of "imperialism,"
would improve his power position both in Egypt and in the
Arab world.10 7 For the United States, France and England an

important waterway, affecting the economy of the Atlantic community, was perceived to be on the verge of falling under the
control of a hostile power. Moreover, the power of England and
France in the Middle East, measured in terms of their ability to
have their way at Suez, was at stake. Thus, even though Egypt
offered compensation, 108 the demands of the Western powers that
Egypt not take control of the Canal and President Nasser's
determination to do just that, generated a major crisis from the
outset.
The Western powers did not base their claim on a lack of
competence to terminate concession agreements, but on the argament that: (a) the Canal was "impressed with an international
interest;"' 109 and (b) the concession had been incorporated in an
1888 treaty which was designed to guarantee free use of the Canal
for all times. 110 Nor did the Western powers demand specific
performance, insisting instead that the Canal be placed under
international control with a "special" position and "substantial"
revenues for Egypt."' The final outcome of the dispute was a
transfer of the Canal to Egypt and a compensation agreement
signed at Geneva July 14, 1958..12
Both the Suez and Anglo-Iranian cases demonstrate how claims
that a state is without competence to terminate can encourage
the use of coercive strategies when power is perceived to be at
107

N.Y. Times, July 28, 1956, p. 16, col. 3.

108 The offer was for payment of the price of stock on the Paris Exchange

on the day before the taking. Huang, Some International and Legal Aspects of
the Suez Canal Question, 51 Am. J. Int'l L. 277, 303 (1957); N.Y. Times, July 27,
1956, p. 1, col. 1.
109 N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1956, p. 3, col. 3. A "Big Three" foreign ministers'
statement.
110 Huang, supra note 108, at 286-87; see Delson, Nationalization of the Suez
Canal Company: Issues of Public and Private International Law, 57 Colum. L.
Rev. 755 (1957).
Ill N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1956, p. 1, col. 8.
112 Agreement Between United Arab Republic and Companie Francire de
Suez, 54 Am. J. Int'l L 498 (1960).
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stake in a termination. Britain's refusal to recognize this com-

petence in the Iranian government produced a crisis from the
very start:
both in Parliament, especially the Conservative opposition,
and in the Conservative press a vociferous cry went up for the
use of military force against the Iranians to protect British
interests. Herbert Morrison, then Foreign Secretary, was
under constant pressure to employ force not only to protect
the lives of British nationals, but also the properties of the
A.I.O.C., and he had to concede to the extent of several times
sending a warship to the area." 3
The crucial point from the standpoint of community policy is that
pressures to use coercion against both Iran and Egypt would surely
have been less had clear expectations existed that compensated
terminations would be protected by international law."

4

In sharp contrast to the post World War II trend of decision
stands the 1958 arbitration, Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American
Oil Co.," 5 which grew out of a sixty year oil concession negotiated
in 1933. Prior to 1954, Aramco had arranged through its buyers
for all shipments of oil to foreign markets, but in that year Saudi
Arabia entered an agreement with A. S. Onassis giving him, with
certain qualifications, a "right of priority for the transport of oil
for thirty years.""" Under this contract, Onassis was to help the
Saudi government create a national fleet. He was to register a
number of ships with Saudi Arabia, assist in the operation of a
Saudi martime school and employ graduates of the school and
other Saudi nationals; the agreement also promised increased
113 Shwadran, op. cit. supra note 76, at 146. Intense economic pressure was
also brought against the Iranians both to gain a favorable settlement for the
conces_ionaire and to bring down the Mossadeq government. Cottam, op. cit.
supra note 19, at 220; N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1951, P. 8, col. 6.
114 An editorial of the New York Times four months before the Suez military
intervention indicates how distorted was the common view of the situation:
"One man's angry will cannot be allowed to destroy a whole economic fabric
in which half the world is vitally concerned ....
There has been a violent flouting
of the whole principle of international agreement and the honoring of pledges
.iven.... The U.N. must act not to arbitrate.., but to rescue Egypt from the
folly of her dictator." N.Y. Times, July 30. 1956, p. 20, col. 1; in the Afro-Asian
and Communists worlds, however, the taldng was perceived to be lawful. Id.,
July 30, 1956, p. 3, col. 1; Id., Aug. 7, 1956, p. 2, col. 3.
I11 This case is the major authoritative decision supporting the "modem"
viev on concession termination. ". . . perhaps the most important arbitral award
interpretative of international concessions ever rendered," Schwebel, supra note 7,
at 272. "This Award is entitled to have, and will have, great weight," Ray, supra
note 9, at 49.
110 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil, supra note 48.
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revenue for the Saudi government." 7 Aramco, fearing that the
18
Onassis agreement would drive its customers to competitors,
claimed that its 1933 concession gave it the exclusive right to
decide who carried concession oil from Saudi Arabia. The
arbitrators, accepting this interpretation of the agreement, held
the Onassis agreement a violation of the Aramco concession and
ordered specific performance. Although the government claimed
the competence to interfere with the concession "by virtue of its
sovereignty" 1 9 and without any offer of compensation, the language of the award by clear implication rules out even compensated terminations or alterations.
The Concession has the nature of a constitution which has the
effect of conferring acquired rights on the contracting parties.
By reason of its very sovereignty within its territorial domain,
the State possesses the legal power to grant rights which it
forbids itself to withdraw before the end of the Concession.
...Nothing can prevent a State in the exercise of its sovereignty, from binding itself irrevocably by the provisions of a
concession and from granting to the concesinsoaire irretractable
rights. Such rights have the character of acquired
20
rights.1
It [the government] has guaranteed to the Company that it
would not exercise its sovereignty in any way contrary to the
obligations it has undertaken towards Aramco and to the
rights it has granted. The Sovereignty of the State is not
limited by some exterior cause; it is the State itself which
undertakes the (negative) obligation not to impede the
grantee's exercise of its rights. . . The exclusive right of
Aramco 121
can no longer be modified without the Company's
consent.
This opinion should be compared with the justification given
in the 1932 arbitration, Czechoslovakia v. Radio Corporation of
America, 22 a case with an identical holding and similar facts,
except that Saudi Arabia's interest in developing a national fleet
was worthier of community protection than the Czech interest
in increasing revenue from its telegraph link. But this additional
17
118
"19
120
121

Ibid.

Id. at 143.
Id. at 140-41.
Id. at 168.

Id. at 212-13. The 1933 Concession did not include a government
promise not to terminate during the term of the concession.
12

See note 72 supra.
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fact, combined with over twenty-five years of change in community
perspectives made Aramco a much harder case. Nevertheless, the
Czechoslovakia opinion provided the framework for a rational
inquiry into the policies at stake. The Aramco opinion rejected
this course by refusing to admit there were conflicting interests
that had to be accomodated. By relying on the concept of acquired
rights and by refusing to discuss the possibility of a lawful termination under any circumstances, the Tribunal took the very rigid
position that the investor's interests deserved complete protection
at the expense of the state's interest. The opinion fails to convince because it gives no inkling of why this choice was made or
under what circumstances a similar decision would be taken.
The trend of decision since the Aramco case indicates how
divergent that decision is from community expectations generally.
In 1958 the Indonesian government terminated a number of longterm Dutch concessions as a means of constraining the Netherlands
to change its policy in West New Guinea. The lawfulness of these
expropriations was raised by two Dutch and German cases in
which a deprived concessionaire sought possession of expropriated
tobacco which had found its way to these countries. In neither
case did the concessionaires base their demands on the claim that
states lacked the competence to terminate. 123 Nor did Lord McNair, in his article condemning the terminations, base his charge
of unlawfulness on this ground 24 Both the courts and Lord
McNair implicitly recognized the state's competence, with the
limitation that compensation must be paid.
The 1962 General Assembly debate on the draft resolution of
the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Wealth and
Natural Resources 2' - provides an important insight into community expectations. The Commission's proposed draft resolu123 The claims in each instance related to the absence of compensation and
the purpose (discriminatory and power) of the taling. The two German decisions
which held the terminations non-discriminatory cannot be supported on any
ground; they are reported in English. 28 Int'l L. Rep. 16, 24 (1959) and in
Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures before Foreign Courts, 54 Am. J.
Int'l L. 305 (1960). The two Dutch decisions holding the terminations unlawful
are reported in English in Professor Domkes article. A diplomatic settlement of
the Dutch claims has not yet been reached.
124 McNair, supra note 63, at 218.
125 This Commission was established by the General Assembly in 1958 to
conduct a survey and to make recommendations. Delegates from Afghanistan,
Chile, Guatemala, Netherlands, Philippines, Sweden, U.S.S.R., U.A.R. and the
U.S.A. served on the Commission. Yearbook of the United Nations: 1962 499.
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tion 1 26 contained no reference to agreements, but in the Second
Committee debate the United States and Britain each submitted
corrective amendments. Most disturbing to the British and
American delegates were paragraphs 2 and 3 which clearly implied
that any arrangements for the "exploration, development and
disposition" of natural resources could be changed at the will of
the government.127 Mr. Unwin (U.K.) explained that these paragraphs "could be interpreted" as authorizing interference with the
rights acquired under agreements if the government no longer
considered them "necessary or desirable," and since "that was
assuredly not the Commission's intention,"' 28 he proposed that
both paragraphs be amended to the effect that: "Agreements
freely entered into shall be faithfully observed."' 2 9 The U.S.
delegate proposed a separate paragraph stating: "In the exercise
of permanent sovereignty over their wealth and natural wealth
and resources, peoples and nations shall faithfully observe agreements freely entered into. . ..",30
These and other amendments which would have embodied
the theory of the "modern" view on concessions received such a
cool reception that all were withdrawn or revised. Only when the
reference to agreements was removed from the context of expropriation or the exercise of state sovereignty could sufficient support
to carry an amendment be mustered. As finally approved by the
Second. Committee and later by a plenary session of the General
Assembly, paragraph 8 of the resolution states:
Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by or
between sovereign states shall be observed in good faith.
States and international organizations shall strictly and conscientiously respect the sovereignty of peoples and nations
over their natural wealth and resources in accordance with
the Charter and the principles set forth in the present
resolution. 131
126 U.N. iDoc. No. (/C. 2/L 654 (1962).
127 Ibid.
128U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 17th Sess., 2nd Comm. 228 (A/C.2/SR.

794-878) (1963).
129 U.N. Doc. No. A/C 2/L 669 (1962).
130 U.N. Doc.NO. A/C. 2/L 688 (1962).
'3' General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) Dec. 14, 1962; the vote was
87-2-12 with France and the Union of South Africa against, the Communist states,
Ghana, Cuba and Burma abstaining. Yearbook of the United Nations: 1962 504.
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This ambiguous 132 compromise did not, however, satisfy a substantial bloc of capital importing states who insisted that the
reference to agreements in paragraph 8 be explicitly limited to
agreements "between sovereign states."' 3 3 This amendment was
defeated 47-33-11, but the considerable support for it,"3 in the
face of strong U.S. opposition, raises serious questions about the
chances of ever developing a substantial consensus on the "modern" view. In strong contrast, the requirement of compensation
as a limitation on state competence to terminate, was challenged
in debate only by the communist delegates.
The most recent termination dispute of importance resulted
from the Argentine government's decision of November 15, 1963
to expropriate fourteen foreign and Argentine oil concessions
which had been granted in 1958.135 During the 1963 Presidential
campaign, both the legality of the concessions and the desirability
of terminating them became an issue. President Illia who had
campaigned on a promise to terminate, took office on October 12
and the next month the nationalization was announced. At the
time of the taking, the expectation in Argentine political circles
was that President Illia would not remain in power two months
6
if the contracts were not terminated.1"
The expropriation brought the immediate intervention of the
U.S. government which demanded either compensation or a new
agreement with the U.S. concessionaires. President Kennedy
publicly stated that: "We can insist that there be equitable
standards for compensating those whose property is taken away
from them." But neither Washington nor the U.S. companies
2
13
Explaining his vote, the Australian delegate noted that "agreements between two States were not fundamentally different from those deriving from
contracts between a State and a private individual or company. A State was free
to terminate a contract but should do so only in exceptional cases, as such action
did not encourage co-operation." The U.S. delegate then expressed his pleasure
that "the Committee had affirmed the binding nature of agreements concerning
foreign investment, including agreements by States with private investors," U.N.
GEN.Ass. Oral. REc. 17th Sess., 2nd Comm. 396 (A/C. 2/SR. 794-878) (1963).
133 U.N. Doc. No. A/C. 2/L 654 (1962).
131 For the amendment besides the Communist states were: Sudan, Syria,
Tanganyika, Uganda, U.A.RL, Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon,
Cuba, Ethiopia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania,
Morocco and Saudi Arabia. Abstaining were Tunisia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Costa
Rica, Ghana, Guatemala, Iran, Liberia, Mexico, Nepal and Peru. U.N. GEN. Ass.
OFF. REc. 17th Sess., 2nd Comm. 389 (A/C. 2/SR. 794-878 (196.3).
135 N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1963, p. 34, col. 1.
136 N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 19&.3, p. 49, col. 1.
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questioned Argentina's "right" to cancel her oil contracts with
American companies. 13 7 By the summer of 1964, agreement in
principle was reached that the government would repay the
capital invested by the U.S. companies, although interest rates
138
and claims for past oil deliveries were still in dispute.
Even though community expectations about how future termination disputes will be settled are far from settled, it is clear: (a)
that the trend of decision is toward recognition of state competence to terminate; and (b) that the Aramco decision and the
large body of doctrinal opinion supporting the "modern" view
constitute a distinct countertrend, which is no doubt fortified by
the strong demands for recognition of this competence. To suggest that the decisions of the past twenty-five years were "influenced by political considerations,"' 39 or do not form a "consistent
pattern,"' 40 or represent "diplomatic expediency"' 4 1 and not the
law, obscures the significance of these cases in providing us the
best available view into the future and the clearest anticipation of
what the law will be.
IV. Conclusion
It is submitted, that the community policy recommended here
is better able and more likely to promote the common interest
than the "modern" view, which denies the competence of states
to terminate their concession agreements. For this reason it offers
greater promise of eliminating concession terminations as a source
of friction between states. First, the policy protecting state
competence to terminate works a more reasonable compromise
between the conflicting interests at stake. It protects the exclusive
interests of the state and the investor, but also requires some
compromise from each; it minimizes the risk of coercion and is
capable of maintaining a flow of foreign investment. Second,
because of this reasonableness, the chances are greater that the
recommended policy, rather than the "modern" view, will become
international law. No policy can be "recognized by international
137 N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1963, p. 1, col. 1.
138 N.Y. Times, June 30, 1964, p. 41, col. 2.
139 Carlston, supra note 10, at 276.
14o Committee on the Study of Nationalization, supra note 2 at 373.
141 Ray, supra note 9, at 19.
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law" 142 without broad community support, flowing from a conviction that it represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting interests. But because of the one-sided balance struck by
the policy denying competence to terminate, it holds little prospect
of gaining substantial international support. Thus, even if one
accepts the argument that terminating governments do not, and
never have, paid enough compensation to maintain a flow of
foreign investment, international consensus can be expected to
develop more rapidly for a policy of adequate compensation than
for a policy of specific performance. Consequently, the recommended policy offers a greater chance not only of protecting the
exclusive interests of the terminating government but also of
maintaining a flow of international investment.
Another possible argument against the policy recommended
here is that: (a) it will encourage termination; and (b) in the
face of increased terminations, potential investors who equate any
government taking with confiscation will keep their money at
home, as will investors who prefer performance to damages. The
first part of this argument overlooks the reason why most governments respect their agreements; it also overemphasizes the role of
international law in deterring terminations. Governments in
Africa, Asia and South America have a strong national interest in
respecting their agreements. The Indian delegation to the U.N.,
for example, has pointed out that:
The matter was not only one of principle but also one of
expediency, because a country which nationalized foreign
investments could hardly expect to attract them. Since the
development of the underdeveloped countries would take
many years, they had much to gain by importing foreign
capital on mutually acceptable and honorable terms. 143
The same governments, demanding freedom to terminate if they
so desire, also understand that even if sufficient compensation is
paid to maintain a flow of investment, nations which respect their
agreements have a better chance of attracting the available capital
142 Stephen Schwebel foresees a significant deterrent effect on termination
when the unlawfulness of all termination is recognized by international law. See

note 12 s-upra and text accompan)ing.
143U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC., 17th Sess., 2nd Comm. 235 (A/C. 2/SR.

794-878) (1963).
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on the best terms. It is, however, an anticipated injury from the
investment market, not from the international legal process, which
serves as the major constraint on states not to expropriate.
Because the potential loss of foreign capital is normally so
important, the promised gain from termination must be great in
order to tip the decision in that direction. The disputes of the
last fifteen years have demonstrated that: (a) the government's
internal power position must usually be at stake to influence its
decision in favor of termination; and (b) when this value is
significantly involved even the threat of military force will not
produce specific performance. 144 It is concluded, therefore, that
the non-legal constraint which serves the major task of promoting
respect for concessions will function as well under a community
policy recognizing competence to terminate, while community
coercion on behalf of the "modern" view will not significantly
deter important terminations and will increase the risk of crisis
in post termination enforcement actions.
No doubt a community policy protecting terminated compensations would deter those investors who perceive every taking
of alien property to be a confiscation or theft, whether it is
compensated or not.1 45 But can it be seriously suggested that
international law should refuse to recognize an important state
interest because of investor ignorance? Finally, there is the
investor who prefers performance to compensation. Will he not
be constrained to keep his money at home by the policy recommended here? First, the decisions of this investor should have
little effect on the flow of investment if the perceived risk of
termination does not increase, and it is, of course, his anticipated
reaction which constrains governments to perform their agreements. Second, compensated contract terminations are protected
144 Mr. Schwebel characterizes any non-economic reason for termination as
"emotional," the implication being that such a reason is not worthy of community
protection. See note 12 supra and text.
145 "Expropriation has the connotation of confiscation to the United States
interests; . . . Historically experience has shown that reasonable minds may differ
in a substantial degree about what is fair compensation in these cases, how quicidy
it should be paid and in what currency it should be paid. Thus the United States
enterpriser feels that if expropriation procedures become operative the effect is an
ouster with an inadequate compensation." Galvin, Some Comments on the Oil
and Gas Entrepreneurand Mineral Concessions in Latin America, 52 Am. Sod'y
Int'l L. Proc. 217, 220 (1958).
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in most municipal legal systems 46 without serious harm to the
national economy. Do not businessmen in intrastate contracts
also prefer performance to damages? Third, the function of international law is not merely to promote investment and to protect
investors, but to accommodate all interests competing in a termination dispute. Viewed this way, a slightly detrimental effect on
the international economy and on the position of investors can be
tolerated as a means of promoting the common good, which
includes the protection of both exclusive and inclusive interests.
140
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